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Product Review Record

Title/Subject:

THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT: INDIA'S CHAIRMANSHIP
AND RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERPOWERS

- ☒ Typescript
- ☐ Intelligence Memorandum
- ☐ Intelligence Assessment
- ☐ Research Paper
- ☐ Reference Aid
- ☐ Technical Intell. Report
- ☐ Other

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1 March 83

Purpose or Requirement; Target Audience:

This paper combines efforts by
OGI and NESA analysts in order
to highlight both the NAM as an
institution and India's national
objectives as Nonaligned chairman.

Coordination:

Within DDI SOVA, EA, ALA

Outside DDI _____

Remarks (including extent of external consultation):

D/NESA
D/OGI

Good cinema - only one question
comment on pg 4.

DK

☐ In DDI Research Program? No

Requestor (if any):

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Analyst:

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Bob Ames D/NESA

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

2 MAR 1983

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR: See distribution

FROM : [redacted]
Director of Global Issues

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SUBJECT : The New Delhi Nonaligned Summit [redacted]

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1. Attached is our assessment of the upcoming Nonaligned summit in New Delhi. The paper includes analysis of: the possibility that the LDCs will develop a new approach to the North-South dialogue; India's attempt to use the Nonaligned chairmanship to balance its relations with Moscow and Washington; [redacted] and the efforts by Nonaligned moderates to make the NAM equidistant between the superpowers. [redacted]

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2. Questions may be directed to Acting Chief, Third World Issues Branch, Economics Division [redacted]

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Attachment:

The Nonaligned Movement: India's Chairmanship
and Relations with the Superpowers [redacted]
GI M 83-10052C, NESM M 83-10048C,
March 1983

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Subject: The Nonaligned Movement: India's Chairmanship and
Relations with the Superpowers

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT: INDIA'S CHAIRMANSHIP
AND RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERPOWERS

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Summary

The 7-11 March summit of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) in New Delhi marks the end of Cuba's contentious three-year chairmanship which gave the Movement a pronounced anti-US bias and strained Nonaligned unity. We believe that Moscow is nervous about the shift in chairmanship from a loyal client to India, a more independent-minded country.

We believe that Moscow is overreacting to the change in chairmanship. the NAM is unlikely to condemn the USSR and will continue its criticism of US policies concerning the Middle East, southern Africa, the New International Economic Order, and disarmament.

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For Prime Minister Gandhi, assuming chairmanship of the Movement provides an opportunity to restore Indian leadership among Third World nations as well as her personal prestige. Gandhi's aspirations for leadership in the NAM have constrained New Delhi's association with the Soviets. The Indian view of nonalignment as equidistance from the two superpowers provides the ideological rationale for New Delhi's moves to balance India's ties with Moscow by improving diplomatic relations with the West. At the same time, New Delhi has been careful to avoid the appearance of a shift to pro-US positions. To avoid divisive East-West political issues such as Afghanistan and Kampuchea, New Delhi aims to highlight North-South economic issues of concern to both moderates and radicals. India will try to lead the NAM away from the stalemated Global Negotiations toward less ambitious proposals for reforms in such UN specialized agencies as the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT. New Delhi agrees these proposals will bring immediate economic assistance to the Third World.

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We have found that Nonaligned rhetoric, though critical of the United States, has little impact on US bilateral relations with NAM members. We believe that most Nonaligned members deviate from NAM positions and cooperate with the United States when their interests require. If India wins Nonaligned endorsement for a change in seeking reform in the specialized agencies, we expect the LDCs to press the United States and other industrial countries to respond favorably at UNCTAD VI in June.

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This memorandum was prepared by Office of Global Issues, and Office of Near East and South Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to the Acting Chief, Third World Issues Branch, OGI, or Chief, Subcontinent Branch, NESAC.

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NESAC M 83-10048C

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**THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT:
INDIA'S CHAIRMANSHIP AND RELATIONS
WITH THE SUPERPOWERS**

Introduction

The 97-member Nonaligned Movement (NAM) will hold its triennial summit conference in New Delhi 7-11 March. At the summit, the Movement's chairmanship will shift from Cuba, the host of the 1979 summit, to India. According to embassy reports New Delhi wants the summit to avoid the East-West conflicts injected into the NAM by Cuba and instead stress initiatives on economic issues. Since its inception in 1961 the NAM has made proposals on disarmament and North-South economic relations to which the United States has had to respond in such international organizations as the Committee on Disarmament, UNCTAD, and the International Monetary Fund. For the past three years, Cuba has used the Movement as a forum to condemn US policies in the Middle East, southern Africa, and Central America. The Movement's heterogeneous membership coupled with its convention that decisions require all members to either concur or abstain has limited the areas on which it can agree. As a result, the NAM has been making similar broad-brush proposals on the same issues for many years even though they have produced meager results.

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The Agenda

The summit's draft communique indicates that the heads of state will concentrate on the NAM's four traditional objectives: the creation of a Palestinian state; black rule in Namibia and South Africa; the establishment of a New International Economic Order that would restructure international economic institutions to favor the developing countries; and disarmament by both the United States and the Soviet Union with the savings used to aid Third World development. We expect the New Delhi summit to repeat the Movement's demand that the United States take prompt and decisive action to help

STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

The Nonaligned Movement was established in 1961 at a summit conference of 25 countries in Yugoslavia. The founders designed the movement as a refuge for countries that did not belong to the alliance systems of either the United States or the Soviet Union.

The NAM is characterized by a series of meetings and declarations. It does not possess a mechanism for translating its positions into action. The Group of 77, which contains 23 more members than the NAM, and its subgroups are responsible for conducting multilateral negotiations for the Third World in international organizations. The NAM, however, has spawned ideas that the Group of 77 has carried forward. For example, the NAM inspired:

- o The creation of UNCTAD
- o The proposal for a New International Economic Order
- o Global Negotiations
- o Special sessions of the UN General Assembly on disarmament.

The NAM is led by a chairman and a 36 member Coordinating Bureau. The chairmanship and the composition of the Coordinating Bureau change at each summit.

[redacted]
realize these objectives. [redacted]

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We believe three other Nonaligned issues will arise at the summit:

- o Nonaligned moderates and radicals will debate whether the Movement should be equally critical toward the superpowers or continue to single out the United States for attack.
- o ASEAN members will try to override Vietnamese objections and have the Movement invite Prince Sihanouk, the leader of the Kampuchean government in exile, to address the summit.
- o India will try to gain Nonaligned approval for concrete action to break the impasse in the North-South dialogue and to accelerate economic cooperation among developing countries. [redacted]

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Several other issues outside the official summit agenda may also come up at New Delhi:

- o Our embassy in Cairo reports that Egyptian President Mubarak may try to improve his standing in the Arab world by meeting at the summit with the heads of the PLO and various Arab governments.
- o Both Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Iranian President Khamenei are scheduled to attend the summit and, according to embassy reports, the NAM will try to revive its effort to mediate the Iran-Iraq War.
- o [redacted] Jordan and other Arab moderates will seek strong Nonaligned endorsement of the Arab League's Fez peace proposal, which implicitly recognizes Israel, in order to give PLO Chief Arafat assistance in persuading PLO hardliners to back the Fez proposal.
- o Embassy reports suggest that the Soviet Union and Afghanistan will try to enhance their image among Nonaligned members before or during the summit by making positive statements about UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar's Afghanistan peace initiative. [redacted]

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Cuba's Chairmanship

Cuba's tenure as chairman radicalized and divided the NAM. Havana used the chairmanship as a platform to denounce the United States and extol the Soviet Union as the "natural ally" of the Nonaligned. Cuba's initiatives were opposed by a group of moderates which believed the Movement should favor neither the United States nor the Soviet Union. As a result, Nonaligned meetings usually pitted Cuba and 15 to 20 other radical members against an approximately equal number of moderates. [redacted]

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The membership refused to adopt a resolution endorsing the "natural ally" thesis,

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[redacted]

but Cuba utilized its power as chairman to give Nonaligned positions a pronounced anti-US bias. Although the NAM uses consensus decisionmaking procedures, Cuba sometimes proposed resolutions and then declared consensus prematurely by cutting off debate. It also exploited the chairman's prerogative of authoring or co-authoring the draft communiques of Nonaligned meetings. As a result, the Movement blamed the United States for causing or exacerbating conflict in the Middle East, southern Africa, and Central America, and for retarding Third World development. According to embassy reporting, some moderates acquiesced to Cuba's tactics because they did not think the NAM important enough to challenge Havana; others did not want to be accused of defending American interests. [redacted]

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India's Chairmanship

In assuming the chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement, we believe India hopes to refurbish its standing among Nonaligned moderates and eliminate the pro-Soviet bias Cuba injected into the Movement. [redacted] India wants to steer the NAM toward a policy of equidistance between the superpowers and intends to play down divisive East-West issues such as Kampuchea and Afghanistan. Instead, New Delhi wants to initiate concrete proposals on North-South economic issues that can bring radicals and moderates together. New Delhi's efforts to make the NAM equidistant between Washington and Moscow imply concessions to both Soviet and American views. According to our New Delhi embassy, India would prefer to avoid directly criticizing either superpower at the summit, but will permit the radicals to use consensus procedures to stymie any proposed final declaration that does not contain some anti-American rhetoric. [redacted]

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Afghanistan

Reassertion of nonalignment has provided Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi with the justification for a shift toward a more critical stance on the Soviet presence in Afghanistan that has won her goodwill from some Nonaligned moderates, [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] India's statement during the first UN debate on Afghanistan—opposing UN consideration of the Soviet invasion—complicated New Delhi's efforts to improve bilateral relations with moderate nonaligned states, including the oil-rich Arab states and Pakistan. In our view, India's subsequent endorsement of the established NAM position calling for withdrawal of "all foreign forces" from Afghanistan affords Gandhi a public platform from which to advocate Soviet troop withdrawal while reducing the potential costs of a more direct public confrontation with Moscow on the issue. Despite the shift in India's policy on Afghanistan, New Delhi still parts company with other moderates in opposing their calls for direct condemnation of Moscow. On criticism of the USSR as on troop withdrawal the Indians hope to minimize political controversy at the summit in March by invoking precedent. [redacted]

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Kampuchea

The issue of Kampuchea's representation promises to be the most divisive at the summit. At the Havana summit, Cuba used its power as chairman to oust the Pol Pot regime from the Kampuchean seat in the NAM and declared the seat empty. Nonaligned members have since voted overwhelmingly to permit the Pol Pot regime and its successor, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), to retain the Kampuchean seat in the UN General Assembly. [redacted]

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India is one of the few non-radical members that recognizes the Soviet - and Vietnamese - supported People's Republic of Kampuchea - a policy that Gandhi adopted upon her return to power in 1980 after a three year hiatus. Gandhi's policy on Kampuchea reinforced the close association with Moscow that characterized her earlier governments. Differences over the issue of Kampuchea's representation in the Nonaligned Movement have been a continual source of friction between India and other moderates—particularly the ASEAN countries, Egypt, Pakistan, and India's other South Asian neighbors—whose cooperation New Delhi seeks at the forthcoming summit.

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[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] We 25X1

believe Gandhi's apparent decision to adhere to her controversial policy in Kampuchea represents a concession to Soviet displeasure with New Delhi's recent efforts to distance its foreign policy from Moscow's on other issues, including Afghanistan. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

India has attempted to deflect criticism from other moderates in the NAM by treating Phnom Penh's representation as a procedural matter beyond New Delhi's purview [redacted] 25X1

The Indians argue that Kampuchea's seat in the Nonaligned Movement remains vacant in accordance with the policy established at the Havana summit. [redacted] 25X1

only a new Nonaligned consensus can change the policy to which New Delhi is bound to adhere, and India will join the radicals in blocking any consensus that would alter the "empty chair" formula. Aware that India and the radicals will prevent the CGDK from claiming the Kampuchean seat in the NAM, the ASEAN members have focused their efforts on having Prince Sihanouk invited to address the summit in his capacity as one of the NAM's founding members. To achieve this the ASEAN members would have to mobilize enough support among the heads of state to force Vietnam and other radicals to relent. We doubt ASEAN will succeed. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

India's Economic Initiatives

While we think India will follow the summit consensus on political questions, embassy reporting indicates it will be assertive on North-South economic issues. According to embassy reports India wants to use the summit to capitalize on the willingness to compromise it detects in several West European governments. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] India recognizes that Global Negotiations, the centerpiece of the North-South dialogue since 1979, has almost no chance of success; consequently it favors less ambitious sectoral negotiations. Global Negotiations entail the establishment of a Third World-dominated central political body in the United Nations to guide and [redacted] 25X1

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[redacted]

coordinate discussions on economic issues in such UN specialized agencies as the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT. Sectoral negotiations would involve discussions in the specialized agencies without guidance from a central political body. According to embassy reporting, some industrialized nations — particularly France, Canada, and the Nordic countries — are ready to consider reforms in the specialized agencies, such as permitting the IMF to allocate more Special Drawing Rights to the LDCs and creating an energy affiliate in the World Bank to finance Third World energy projects. [redacted]

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Because they are less politicized, sectoral negotiations could produce results in a relatively short time and, therefore, we believe many Nonaligned members will find them attractive. However, embassy reports indicate that some members still hope Global Negotiations will bring about major reforms in the specialized agencies and will resist India's attempt to deemphasize the global approach. We believe India will make headway at the summit only if it bills sectoral negotiations as a partial remedy for the immediate problems of the Third World rather than a substitute for Global Negotiations. If India should win Nonaligned endorsement for sectoral negotiations, we expect the LDCs to press the United States to respond favorably at the quadrennial UNCTAD negotiating session between industrial and developing countries scheduled for June in Yugoslavia. [redacted]

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We suspect that the summit will also make an initiative on the Third World debt problem. The New Delhi draft communique calls for the creation of an International Debt Commission to find ways of helping debt-ridden LDCs. We are not aware of any specific measures the LDCs have in mind, but they may crystallize at the summit. In our judgment, debt discussions in New Delhi may lay the groundwork for proposals that could surface at UNCTAD where we anticipate a strong LDC push for financial relief. [redacted]

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The NAM and the Superpowers

We believe Moscow is nervous about the passing of the Nonaligned chairmanship from a loyal client to a more independent-minded country. [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

According to an academic study, the Soviet Union has traditionally influenced the NAM by using the radicals, many of whom are Soviet clients, to block consensus on positions critical of the Soviet Union. As a result, Moscow has helped keep Nonaligned attention focused on American rather than Soviet policies in the Third World. We believe Moscow is overreacting to the change in chairmanship since, in our judgment the NAM will not include the USSR in its condemnation. [REDACTED]

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Regardless of the effectiveness of Soviet efforts, we believe the NAM's core concerns — the creation of a Palestinian homeland, black rule in southern Africa, disarmament, and New International Economic Order — will continue to yield sharp criticism of the United States. However, a State Department study demonstrates that Nonaligned resolutions have little effect on the United States' bilateral relations with Nonaligned members. Nonaligned procedure permits the members most involved in an issue to shape the Movement's position on it; the rest usually join the consensus in exchange for support on issues of importance to them or for the sake of Nonaligned unity. We believe most Nonaligned members would deviate from Nonaligned resolutions

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[REDACTED]

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and cooperate with the United States if their interests so required. [REDACTED]

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India and the Superpowers

We believe Gandhi's effort to cooperate with other leading moderates in moving the NAM away from the Soviet camp, despite limited prospects for success, aims in part to restore her credibility as a truly nonaligned leader. Following her return to power in 1980, Gandhi's policies on Afghanistan and Kampuchea threatened to isolate India from other Nonaligned moderates at the 1981 NAM ministerial in New Delhi. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Gandhi's renewed commitment since then to a policy of "equidistance" from both superpowers has provided an ideological rationale for her moves to balance New Delhi's need to refurbish India's credentials as a nonaligned state against the desire to avoid jeopardizing Soviet weapons assistance, economic ties, and diplomatic support. [REDACTED]

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Despite efforts by New Delhi to avoid incurring Soviet displeasure, Moscow has exerted major pressures on India with a view—we believe—to dissuading Gandhi from working to remove the pro-Soviet bias of the Nonaligned Movement. The Soviet disinformation campaign directed at India and the NAM has probably influenced Gandhi's estimate of the domestic and international costs of greater moderation in Indian policy and heightened her longstanding suspicions of US intentions. [REDACTED]

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Nevertheless, we believe Gandhi will continue to sidestep Soviet pressures to

[REDACTED]

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THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT: A TOOL OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY

As India assumes the chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement, New Delhi's efforts to promote unity and moderation in the movement will—in our view—serve also to further Prime Minister Gandhi's foreign policy objectives:

- Restoration of India to a position of recognized international leadership in the Nonaligned Movement which Gandhi's father helped to found. We believe that the rapid growth and regional diversification of the membership has enhanced the movement's importance as a forum for Indian diplomacy.

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- [redacted]
[redacted] Gandhi has reportedly chosen the issue of disarmament as a platform for projecting her leadership. She will also continue to seek a central role for her government as a mediator in disputes between NAM countries. Most recently, New Delhi has offered India's good offices in promoting a Middle East peace settlement both before and during the NAM summit, according to US embassy sources.

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- Re-balancing India's foreign policy to afford greater flexibility for New Delhi. Gandhi stresses the independence of Indian policy stands, its equidistance between Washington and Moscow, and the value of good relations with other third world countries—especially nonaligned moderates. We believe Gandhi's dialogues with China and Pakistan reflect in part her desire to broaden India's options.

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- Reducing the superpower presence, especially in South Asia. Gandhi seeks to reduce the likelihood of superpower confrontation there and enhance India's hegemony on the subcontinent. We see efforts to promote the regional resolution of conflicts and friendship pacts between neighbors throughout the third world as likewise aiming to reduce opportunities for superpower intervention. The Indian press suggests New Delhi views the growth in NAM membership as indicating a welcome reduction in the number of countries subject to the obligations of superpower military alliances.

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[redacted]

provide greater support for Moscow's foreign policy goals. Her pursuit of a more consistent nonaligned policy has added momentum to her efforts to expand India's foreign policy flexibility. Concerned over India's isolation as a result of its close identification with the USSR, Gandhi has improved relations with Washington. She has worked to strengthen political, military, and economic ties with West European states, which provide her with an alternative to superpower sources of military and economic assistance. Longstanding preoccupation with potential threats to India's security continue to limit breakthroughs in India's relations with China and Pakistan, but Gandhi's desire to achieve an international leadership role through the Nonaligned Movement has contributed to the more flexible policies she has adopted in relations with Islamabad and Beijing. [redacted]

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In our view, India will continue to make policy choices that strike a rough balance between the two superpowers. Gandhi's aspirations for leadership in the Nonaligned Movement have constrained New Delhi's close association with the Soviets; her muted opposition to Moscow's Afghanistan policy signals her determination to pursue Indian interests even at some potential cost to Indo-Soviet ties. We believe Gandhi will avoid closer identification with the Soviets by refusing Moscow basing rights in India and ignoring Soviet proposals for an Asian or Persian Gulf collective security scheme but will not risk an open break by abandoning Indian policy on Kampuchea. [redacted]

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At the same time, Gandhi and her senior officials have been careful to avoid the appearance of a shift to pro-US positions. [redacted]

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[redacted]

Gandhi will continue to use nonalignment as a basis on which to criticize the US presence in the Indian Ocean and US security assistance to Pakistan. [redacted]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Opposing hostile

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reference to the United States, however, will permit India to counter moderate efforts to
condemn the Soviet Union by name on Afghanistan.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Nonaligned Radicals and Moderates

About 40 Nonaligned members seek to influence the Movement's direction. Most of these members can be characterized as either moderate or radical, though some, like Algeria, display both tendencies. The remaining members are interested in issues directly affecting them but are largely apathetic toward others.

Radicals

- | | |
|----------------|-----------------|
| 1. Afghanistan | 10. Nicaragua |
| 2. Angola | 11. North Korea |
| 3. Cuba | 12. Seychelles |
| 4. Ethiopia | 13. South Yemen |
| 5. Grenada | 14. Syria |
| 6. Iran | 15. SWAPO |
| 7. Laos | 16. Vietnam |
| 8. Madagascar | 17. PLO |
| 9. Mozambique | |

Moderates

- | | |
|----------------|------------------|
| 1. Bangladesh | 11. Oman |
| 2. Botswana | 12. Pakistan |
| 3. Egypt | 13. Nigeria |
| 4. Jamaica | 14. Saudi Arabia |
| 5. India | 15. Senegal |
| 6. Indonesia | 16. Singapore |
| 7. Ivory Coast | 17. Sri Lanka |
| 8. Kenya | 18. Yugoslavia |
| 9. Malaysia | 19. Zaire |
| 10. Morocco | |

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Nonaligned Membership

The Nonaligned Movement presently has five, loosely interpreted, criteria for membership:

- o An independent foreign policy based on peaceful coexistence.
- o Support for national liberation movements.
- o Non-membership in multilateral military alliances related to great power conflicts.
- o Non-membership in bilateral or regional defense pacts related to great power conflicts.
- o No willing acceptance of foreign military bases.

Nonaligned membership is regionally skewed. All Arab and black African states belong as do most Asian countries, but only 14 of 32 Latin American states are members. Latin America's under-representation reflects the Movement's preoccupation with decolonization, a Palestinian homeland, and black rule in southern Africa.

- | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Afghanistan | 34. Indonesia | 66. Panama |
| 2. Algeria | 35. Iran | 67. Peru |
| 3. Angola | 36. Iraq | 68. Qatar |
| 4. Argentina | 37. Ivory Coast | 69. Rwanda |
| 5. Bahrain | 38. Jamaica | 70. Sao Tome and Principe |
| 6. Bangladesh | 39. Jordan | 71. Saudi Arabia |
| 7. Belize | 40. Kampuchea | 72. Senegal |
| 8. Benin | 41. Kenya | 73. Seychelles |
| 9. Bhutan | 42. Kuwait | 74. Sierra Leone |
| 10. Bolivia | 43. Laos | 75. Singapore |
| 11. Botswana | 44. Lebanon | 76. Somalia |
| 12. Burundi | 45. Lesotho | 77. South-West Africa |
| 13. Cameroon | 46. Liberia | People's Organization |
| 14. Cape Verde | 47. Libya | 78. Sri Lanka |
| 15. Central African Rep. | 48. Madagascar | 79. St. Lucia |
| 16. Chad | 49. Malawi | 80. Sudan |
| 17. Comoros | 50. Malaysia | 81. Suriname |
| 18. Congo | 51. Maldives | 82. Swaziland |
| 19. Cuba | 52. Mali | 83. Syria |
| 20. Cyprus | 53. Malta | 84. Tanzania |
| 21. Djibouti | 54. Mauritania | 85. Togo |
| 22. Ecuador | 55. Mauritius | 86. Trinidad and Tobago |
| 23. Egypt | 56. Morocco | 87. Tunisia |
| 24. Equatorial Guinea | 57. Mozambique | 88. Uganda |
| 25. Ethiopia | 58. Nepal | 89. United Arab Emirates |
| 26. Gabon | 59. Nicaragua | 90. Upper Volta |
| 27. Gambia | 60. Niger | 91. Vietnam |
| 28. Ghana | 61. Nigeria | 92. North Yemen |
| 29. Grenada | 62. North Korea | 93. South Yemen |
| 30. Guinea | 63. Oman | 94. Yugoslavia |
| 31. Guinea-Bissau | 64. Pakistan | 95. Zaire |
| 32. Guyana | 65. Palestine Liberation | 96. Zambia |
| 33. India | Organization | 97. Zimbabwe |

MEMBERS OF THE GROUP OF 77 WHO DO NOT BELONG
TO THE NAM

- | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Bahamas* | 13. Haiti |
| 2. Barbados* | 14. Mexico |
| 3. Bolivia | 15. Paraguay |
| 4. Brazil | 16. Philippines |
| 5. Burma** | 17. Romania |
| 6. Chile*** | 18. Solomon Islands |
| 7. Colombia* | 19. South Korea |
| 8. Costa Rica | 20. Thailand |
| 9. Dominican Republic | 21. Uruguay |
| 10. El Salvador | 22. Venezuela |
| 11. Fiji | 23. Western Samoa |
| 12. Guatemala | |

-
- * Will apply for Nonaligned membership at New Delhi summit.
** Withdrew from NAM in 1979.
*** Unofficially withdrew from NAM in 1976.